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Introduction 
TIIE EMERGING LAW IN RESIDENTIAL 
REAL ESTATE RESALE 
DISCLOSURES -- IS IT STYMIED! 
by 
Saul S. Le Vine• 
In 1985, the California legislature enacted the first statute requiring sellers of residential 
real property and participating brokers to disclose to prospective purchasers comprehensive 
information relative to the condition, value and desirability of the property offered fur sale. As a 
resuh of this legislation, a substantial number o{other states passed legislation mandating some 
furm of disclosure by sellers but not by brokers. Many states are currently considering a more 
limited form of numdatory property-condition disclosure legislation. 
The Califurnia legislation1 essentially codified the state's unique common law 
requirement that both sellers and brokers discover and disclose all information material to the 
value and desirability of the property offered for sale.2 In the states where this bas been enacted 
however, the prevailing furm of limited disclosure legislation bas used the local common law 
which is f8r less than the California standards.3 The desirability of this movement toward 
enacting property condition disclosure legislation can be most usefully evaluated only after a 
comparative analysis of the common law, the various legislative regulatory schemes and the 
effects of the latter on the evolution of the furmer. 
Common Law 
An examination of the common law development of inspection and disclosure duties on 
sellers, brokers and buyers in the residential real estate sales market concludes that the common 
law bas been developing in a filshion which creates greater duties of 1irirness and commercial 
reasonableness on sellers and brokers. Various states have also imposed an explicit duty of 
inspection or disclosure on sellers or brokers. 4 These requirements have taken the furm of being 
enacted by statute in many states. In some states regulatory agencies covering real estate brokers 
have promulgated. 5 
History- Common Law 
The right to buy, own and sell property is inherent and much protected individual rights 
under common law in this country. These rights have been reflected in the applicable provisions 
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of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. 6 It has always been consistently 
held that property rights in connection with the sale of residential real property by its owner was 
not burdened with the imposition of affirmative disclosure duties by the judicially created 
traditional common law.7 
The case history seems to have created the duty to evaluate the property on the buyer 
rather than the seller or his agent (broker). It was held that mere non-disclosure of material facts 
would normally not be a ground fur action in the nature of misrepresentation. 8 This furmed the 
concept of the traditional caveat emptor, let the buyer beware or take care. 9 
Also serving to insulate the seller from liability and relating to caveat emptor is the 
doctrine of "merger" in a real estate transaction. This doctrine holds that all warranties and 
representations made in connection with a sale, are considered to be merged into the deed, unless 
specifically expressed in writing to survive delivery of the deed. 10 The deed is considered full 
compliance and perfOrmance of the obligations created in the Contract of Sale. 11 Once the buyer 
accepts the deed, the Contract ceases to exist and the rights of the seller and buyer are regulated 
by the deed. 12 
!he mergc:r doctrine and .all contract covenants that relate to title. 
possession, quantity or conditions of the land. TraditiOnally, a purchaser of a resale residence 
had no remedy against the seller under an implied warranty of habitability theory, which theory 
was generally applied to the sale of newly constructed homes. 14 
In 1992, a New Jersey Appellate Court broke new ground by allowing a buyer to recover 
against the seller of a resale home with a defective septic tank. The Court held that "an implied 
warranty of habitability should also apply to the sale of a used home", because it is based on 
"current notions of what is right and just. "15 This law had been established that the elements of 
intentional misrepresentation are: 
1. a mise representation of fact; 
2. knowledge by the defendant that the representation is mise or a reckless disregard fur 
the truth or fillsity of the statement; 
3. the knowledge to induce the plaintiff to rely on the information; 
4. plaintiff's justifiable reliance upon such representation; and 
S. resultant damage from such reliance. 16 
The primary difference between negligent misrepresentation and intentional 
misrepresentation is that in a negligent misrepresentation suit the plaintiff does not have to prove 
that the defendant made the fitlse representation with the intention to deceive, or that he or she 
knew the disclosed information was false and just prove lack of reasonable care.17 
The Illinois courts have recognized that an action is maintainable if it allefes the 
elements of a duty owed, a breach of such duty and an injury resuhing from such breach. 1 
Influencing the concept of mandating disclosure through legislation bas been a very 
gradual expansion of the scope of acknowledging common law fraud to include the non-
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disclosure of material information by sellers and brokers.19 The courts increasingly .imposed 
a duty to speak. and coupled with the duties to speak have found liability for non-disclosure 
which is equivalent to fi1lse disclosure.20 
It must be noted that while courts began to hold that non-disclosures may satisf>: 
elements of a fi1lse statement of a material fact, the remaining tort elements of culpability, 
reasonable reliance, causation and damage have remained essential to the recovery under 
common law fraud. 
Under traditional common law, obligations imposed on the seller of real property created 
a duty to prospective purchasers not to make any false representations or actively. conceal any 
defects or material facts.21 That traditional duty did not, however, generally reqwre sellers to 
affirmatively disclose such material facts. silence without to speak has been 
actionable.n However, courts have increasmgly found that certain ctreumstanceS. partiCUlarly 
partial disclosure, create a duty to speak. 23 Therefore, if the seller is asked about or speaks about 
a particular subject, he or she must make a full and fair disclosure as to that so as not to 
mislead the buyer.24 Also rather well established is the complete based 
on a finding of an agency, fiduciary, confidential or other relattonship of trust legally or 
factually between the parties. In several cases in various states, there were findings that there 
were no fiduciary duties between the parties where the seller did have actual of 
the defect. In New York, as noted in my companion paper, the holdings of a vendor-builder was 
liable for fraudulently concealing massive foundation cracks in a home sold to a purchaser.
25 
A majority of state courts bave expanded the scope of the duty of a seller of residential 
real property to disclose material facts to a prospective buyer.26 One the leading cases. is 
Lingsch v. Savage.21 The California Court of Appeals concluded: [Where .it was] "present<:d with 
an instance of mere nondisclosure, rather than active concealment occurnng between parties not 
in a confidential relationship ... that it is now well settled in California that where the seller knows 
of facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property which are known or 
accessible only to him and also knows that such facts an: not known to, or reach of the 
diligent attention and observation of the buyer, the seller ts under a duty to disclose them to the 
buyer. Failure of the seller to fulfill such duty of disclosure constitutes actual :fraud . ..2a 
In a similar case the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed a ruling of summary judgment 
in favor of a seller of real property infested with roaches, holding that "current principles 
grounded on justice and fair dealing ... clearly call for a full trial below . ..29 In support of its 
decision, the court noted that: 
The statement may often be found if either party to a contract of sale conceals or 
suppresses a material fact which he is in good. faith to then his silence is 
fraudulent. The attitude of the courts toward nondJSClosure ts undergomg a change. Contrary to 
Lord Cairn's fiunous remark, it would seem that the object of the law in these cases should be to 
impose on parties to the transaction a duty to speak whenever justice, equity and fair dealing 
demand it. This statement is made only with refurence to instances where the party to be charged 
is an actor in the transaction. This duty to speak does not resuh from an implied representation 
by silence, but exists because a refusal to speak constitutes unfair conduct. 30 
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In a third case, Johnson v. Davis which involved property with a defective root: the 
Florida Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's award of rescission reasoning that: 
. "Modern concepts of and fair dealing have given our courts the opportunity and 
lat1tude to change legal precepts m order to conform to society's needs. Thus the tendency of the 
more recent cases has been to restrict rather than extend the doctrine of caveat emptor. The Jaw 
appears to be working toward the uhimate conclusion that full disclosure of all material facts 
must be made whenever elementary fair conduct demands it. ·.31 
These cases illustrate a trend in state courts to expand the duty of the seller to disclose 
and thereby to make a nondisclosure as actionable as a false discloSW'e. In other words the 
plaintiff must establish all of the several elements of common law fraud as previously set forta 32 
In either case, the materiality of the nondisclosure is critical33 A met is material as a 
matter of common law fraud if "a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or 
nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question. ,,34 Specifically in 
the area of real estate fraud, state courts generally relied on that classic definition held that a 
material fact is one "to which a reasonable man might be expected to attach importance in 
making his choice of action." A Florida Court held that a material fact is one that substantially 
affects the value of the property.35 
.. Although is a mixed question of law and fact, courts have found the following 
condittons to be material so that a seller's fiillure to disclose them is actionable: prior termite 
damage, active termite damage, illegal and condemned building, defective root: detective well 
tailings,. filled soil, septic system, building code violation, 
reqwnng retaining wall pnor to constructing a building, geoerally deteriorated condition of the 
property, wood beetle damage, water rights, contaminated well, basement flooding, drain tile 
underneath house, defects, well property, prior fire damage, tilting 
house, sewer connection charges, house msulated with ureaformaldehyde insulation, defective 
earth-shehered home, and flood damage. 
Although this list is extensive, a few courts have found that sellers bave a duty to disclose 
only where the defect or condition (whether or not material) is dangerous or poses a threat to 
safety.36 Some states sellers are not liable for damages caused by defects existing at 
the time of sale. The courts acknowledge that they are required to "disclose to the purchaser any 
C?ncealed condition known to him that involves an unreasonable danger. Failure to make such 
or. to conceal a condition, render the vendor liable for resuhing 
mJunes. Similarly, a Pennsylvama Appeals Court, in holding the sellers liable for 1il.iling to 
disclose a defective sewage disposal system, affirmed that "the modern view ... holds that where 
there is a serious and dangerous latent defect known to exist by the seller, then he must disclose 
such defect to the unknowing buyer or suffer liability for his fiillure to do so.n31 The facts of this 
case reflect that may not known of the dangerous condition, and suggest that the 
element of culpability may be sattsfied by reckless disregard or negligence where an unsafe 
condition exists. 39 
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Some courts have relieved the seller of liability when the contract contains an "as is" 
clause. Generally, an "as is" clause will be upheld if the defects are "obvi?us" or 
discernible." In the absence of fraud, mutual mistake, or warranty, courts will respect an as IS 
clause.40 
In some jurisdictions, the existence of an "as is" clause: a of for real estate 
will not relieve the vendor of his obligation to disclose a conditton which substantially the 
value or habitability of the property. When the seller bas actual knowledge of the conditron. and 
it and would not be disclosed by a reasonable and diligent inspection to the purchaser, the fiillure 
to disclose bas constituted fraud.41 
Consumer protection laws are typical required disclosure statutes. They usually .list 
prohibited acts and allow damages or rescission to an injured party.42 the. 
Unfair Trade Practice Act, a buyer of residential real estate was awarded rescJSSton m additton to 
monetary and punitive damages for injury reSulting from the seller" nondisclosure of defects. 
The court stated that the seller was obligated to disclose the denied request for a subsur:fuce 
rmit. 43 sewage system pe . 
In cases of passive concealment by the seller of defective real there is 
exception to the rule of caveat emptor ... which imposes a duty on the seller to disclose matenal 
facts which are known or should be known to the seller and which would not be discoverable by 
the buyer's exercise of ordinary care and diligence. 
Brokers have very little incentive (indeed, significant disincentives) to provide 
information to the buyer. Brokers are usually agents of the seller, but in many cases ar; 
effectively representing the buyers and therefOre full disclosure should be compelled. It tS 
suggested that brokers should not be allowed to continue to expect immunity 
of action, and that brokers should be compelled to disclose to the buyer all available informatton. 
Presently, a growing number of courts require brokers in the sale of 
residential real estate to disclose fucts materially affecting the value or desirability of the offered 
property, so long as the f8cts are known by the broker (structural by 
the prospective purchaser, nor available to her through a reasonable Any to 
disclose in accordance with that judicially imposed duty constitutes acttonable fraud, 
of course, that the remaining essential elements of culpability, reasonable reliance, causatton, and 
damages can be established by the complaining purchaser. 
In view of the customary lack of any sort of confidential relationship between a 
prospective purchaser and the selling broker, it bas been difficult for law courts to 
logically impose a duty to disclose on the broker, or even to extend the seller s duty to the real 
estate broker. Ahhough some courts have refused to bold a broker liable on such 
agree with the Lingsch court that an actionable real estate fraud case "does not reqwre pnvtty of 
contract." 
Obligations to Disclose under the Statute 
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In 1984, a California Court of Appeals ruled in the landmark case of Easton v. 
Strassburger46 that a real estate broker acting fur a seller of residential real property has an 
"affirmative duty to conduct a reasonably competent and diligent inspection of the residential 
property listed for sale and to disclose to prospective purchasers all facts materially affecting the 
value or desirability of the property that such an investigation would reveaL"47 At the time 
Easton was decided, state courts, including those in Calitbrnia, bad repeatedly analyzed the 
applicability of the common law torts of fraudulent concealment, intentional misrepresentation, 
and negligent misrepresentation to cases of nondisclosure of property defects. Since an essential 
element for the establishment of common law fraud in a nondisclosure (rather than a fulse 
disclosure) case is the existence of a duty to disclose, erosion of the early doctrine of caveat 
emptor required the courts to define and rationalize the imposition of such a duty on the owner, 
the selling broker, or others participating in the sale of the offered property.48 
No court, in CalifOrnia or elsewhere, however, at the time of Easton bad yet interpreted a 
broker's duty to disclose known defects as including an obligation to conduct a reasonably 
competent and diligent inspection of the property. Further, no court had fuund, based on the 
imposition of such a duty, that a broker is liable to a buyer for negligently failing to disclose such 
discoverable information. The California Courts took a major step forward in expanding, if not 
creating, a remedy fur not only a seller's but also a real estate broker's negligent failure to 
disclose reasonably discoverable defects or other adverse material information to a prospective 
buyer of the residential resale real property. 
In July of 1985, California became the first state to enact legislation specifically covering 
this area of controversy. The legislature acted largely in response to outcries from real estate 
brokers who reacted to the Easton court's expansive view of their duties to inspect and disclose. 
Under the sponsorship and lobbying of the California Association of Reahors, the California 
legislature the first, and still the most comprehensive real property condition disclosure 
legislation. It became effective on January 1, 1986, with respect to brokers and January 1, 
1987, with regard to sellers. The legislature intended to "codify and make precise," but arguably 
also to limit certain obligations under the Easton decision. 
The California legislature chose largely to embrace rather than reject, the expanded 
property condition disclosure requirements laid down by the Easton court. As explained below, 
however, in an effort to set objective, easily understood guidelines fur making full and fair 
disclosure, the legislature may have created statutory scheme that thlls short of what Easton 
requires. As a comequence, the courts as having effectively limited the impact of the Easton 
opinion may interpret the statute. Since California's enactment of its mandatory property 
condition disclosure legislation in 1985, other states have adopted a furm of such regUlation, 
which in every case were very much "watered down" versions of the legislation. 
The CalifOrnia Statutory AJmroach 
Two statutes (collectively the ''California Act") were enacted in response to Easton. The 
first is entitled "Article 1.5 Disclosures Upon Transfer of Residential Property'' (the "Disclosure 
Article"). 51 The second is entitled "Article 2. Duty to Prospective Purchaser of Residential 
Property'' (the "Broker Duty Article"). 52 The statutes are applicable to all sales, exchanges and 
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related transfers for value of residential real property or residential stock cooperatives containing 
four or fewer dwelling units. The Broker Duty Article, of course, only applies to such sales, 
exchanges and transfers involving a licensed real estate broker. The California Act, unlike most 
of the other States, applies to all sales of new or never occupied residences as well as to all 
resales. 53 
Given the Easton holding, it is noteworthy that neither the statutorily mandated form nor 
any other provision of the California Act requires the seller to disclose any defects or other facts 
not specifically called for, even if they are material to the Purchaser's assessment of the value or 
desirability of the property. However, the Disclosure Article makes clear that, "the specification 
of items for disclosure in this article does not limit ... any obligation for disclosure created by any 
other provision of law or which may exist in order to avoid fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit in 
the transfer transaction." In other words, while the new law mandates that specific information 
on a prescribed written form must be actually delivered to the prospective purchaser, it does not 
by its more limited scope effect any limitation on the broader duty to disclose "all filets 
materially affecting the value or desirability of the property, recognized by the Easton opinion." 
$4 
After defining the affirmative disclosure duties of brokers participating in a regulated 
sale, the California legislature, presumably in response to the uncertainties sounded by 
representatives of the real estate brokerage industry, added certain clarifying provisions to the 
statute. For example, Broker Duty Article Section 2079.2 explains that the standard of care 
owed by any broker subject to Section 2079's inspection and disclosure requirements is "the 
degree of care that a reasonably prudent real estate licensee would exercise and is measured by 
the degree of knowledge through education, experience and examination, required to obtain a 
license . ..ss In passing over the reasonably prudent person standard, applicable to most common 
law tort claims including misrepresentation, in mvor of this higher reasonably prudent licensed, 
educated. experienced, aod examined real estate broker standard, the California legislature 
adopted the philosophy seemingly underlying the Easton decision. 56 That philosophy holds that a 
broker who presents himself to prospective purchasers and to the public as an experienced, 
licensed professional in the field of residential real property transactions, and who financially 
benefits as a resuh of so doing, should be held to a standard of care consistent with that position. 
While this stricter standard varies ftom that normally applied under ordinary negligence law 
(reasonable prudent person standard), it is well established in the analogous area of the federal 
regulation of sales of securities. There, the public investor (like the homebuyer) is less able than 
the broker to obtain the relevant information about the proposed investment. As a practical 
matter, he is forced to rely on the selling broker. 
The Disclosure Article offers DO remedy of recession and restitution once the transaction 
has been completed. 57 It does allow a purchaser to recover the actual damages suffered, as a 
result of any person's willful or negligent fiillure to comply with any of the statute's 
requirements. As against the seller, then, who, as noted above, is required to disclose only in 
response to the form's enumerated list of questions, a purchaser may recover damages under the 
statute only if the seller willfully or negligently fiilled to deliver the disclosure statement, fililed 
to answer any of the enumerated questions, or fillsely answered one or more of those questions. 
As mentioned above, this remedy is in addition to, and in DO way replaces or limits, any common 
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law remedy, whether or not grounded in Easton, that may be available to a damaged purchaser. ' 8 
As against brokers, a purchaser may recover damages under the Disclosure Article if the broker 
willfully or negligently failed to adequately complete the visual inspection of the premises or 
fililed to make complete disclosure of material filets discoverable from the inspection required in 
the Broker Duty Article. 
The Disclosure Article makes clear that, irrespective of whether the defendant is a seller 
or a broker, there is no liability for any fillse or omitted information unless it was within the 
actual knowledge of the defendant or, in the case of information supplied by a public agency or a 
recognized expert, unless he or she fililed to exercise ordinary care in obtaining and transmitting 
it. No seller or broker can be found liable for an innocent misstatement or omission; he or she 
must be found guihy of no less than negligence in fulfilling the duties of investigation and 
disclosure as described in the statute. Consistent with the common law, if the seller or broker 
exercised due diligence by meeting the required standard of care, no liability will attach. The 
affirmative defense of due diligence is reinforced by Section 2079.5, which makes it clear that a 
buyer must exercise reasonable care to protect himself and cannot recover from a broker who 
filils to point out a defect or other adverse filet that should have been discovered by a reasonably 
attentive and observant buyer. Indeed, further reinforcement can be inferred from the statutorily 
required suggestion of the mandated disclosure statement that buyers and sellers should consider 
having the property professionally inspected. The statutorily available due diligence defense and 
its recognition of the corresponding purchaser duty of exercising ordinary care is consistent with 
the common law, even as expanded by Easton. Section 1102.4 allows reasonable reliance on 
such experts as licensed engineers, land surveyors, geologists, structural pest control operators, 
contractors and others. 
Neither the California Act nor any of its five earlier legislative undertakings require the 
seller of residential real property to make any disclosure of material information not specifically 
called for by the applicable disclosure document. However, disclosure to prospective buyers of 
all known or reasonably discoverable material information is required of seller and brokers by 
the Easton decision and of brokers by the Broker Duty Article of the California Act. 
Furthermore, disclosure of all known "material defects" (though not other material information) 
is required of brokers by the Maine and New Hampshire Rules. It is noteworthy that other 
statutes also impose upon sellers this more open-ended duty to disclose any other known material 
defects, in addition to the items specifically enumerated in the statute. 59 While these acts mcially 
go further than the Disclosure Article of the California Act, the common law in most 
jurisdictions already prohibits the fraudulent concealment of known defects and increasingly 
requires disclosure of those defects that are reasonably ascertainable by sellers of real property 
and participating brokers. 
Historically, the sale of residential real property, like the sale of other real and personal 
property of all sorts, was regulated largely by the common law torts of fraudulent concealment, 
intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation. The elements of real estate fraud 
are a characteristic and strength of the common law, and the courts to accommodate the realities 
of the marketplace have from time to time adopted them. As a result the courts in the Easton 
case recognized a duty to be imposed upon the sellers of residential real property, and imposing 
the same duty on any and all participating brokers, to inspect the offered real property and to 
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disclose not only any defects discoverable during that inspection, but also "all facts materially 
affecting the value or desirability of the to any and all prospective purchasers. This 
expansion of real estate fraud to provide a common law damage remedy for buyers in California 
would, in the normal course, have been further refined by case law in that state. No doubt it 
would also have been adopted by at least some other state courts that have long regarded the 
California courts to beat the forefront of tort law evolution. Instead, the major consequence of 
the Easton decision was the enactment of the California Act. The impact of that legislation on 
the scope and direction of the law of real estate fraud bas been and continues to be enormous. 
Essentially the evolving Easton approach, even to the extent, preserved in the California 
codification, now stands stymied. 
The California Act largely codified and thereby ratified the expanded duties owed by the 
sellers and brokers of residential real property. The Disclosure Article goes further than the 
judicially created law by affirmatively requiring the preparation and delivery of a disclosure 
statement containing prescribed detailed useful information, and by providing a buyer with a 
remedy for any damages caused by a violation of that requirement. While the statutory 
disclosure requirement clearly helps the buyer obtain at least some useful information, and 
presumably makes him aware of the right to obtain correct and complete information, it adds 
only modestly to the broad run from the earlier of the date of the discovery of the actionable 
misstatement or omission on the date on which it should reasonably have been discovered. 
Unlike the Disclosure Article, there is no provision in the Broker Duty Article stating that 
it is in addition to the broader duty and corresponding remedy afforded a prospective buyer by 
the Easton opinion. Accordingly, it could be argued that the California legislature was persuaded 
and that it intended to ratify only a portion of Easton, thereby limiting the scope of the broker's 
duty of inspection and disclosure to that expressly detailed in that Article.61 Under this analysis, 
one etrect ofthe statute is to reduce the risk of liability that existed after Easton to a broker who 
provides fillse or incomplete disclosure. As a practical matter, such an interpretation of the 
statute would be to affi>rd protection to the broker at the expense of the buyer, and perhaps more 
importantly, at the expense of the seller to whom the buyer would be forced to look exclusively 
for his or her remedy. Until the intent of the legislature is determined by the California courts 
faced with filets that would cause a broker to be found liable under Easton but not under the 
statute, the effect of the statute on the then-existing common law in this critical area of broker 
liability is a continuing uncertainty. 
In most jurisdictions other than California, the early well-established doctrine of caveat 
emptor remained substantially intact, precluding or at least slowing any judicial creation and 
expansion of disclosure duties necessary to support a remedy for nondisclosure. In general. an 
uninformed, rather than misinformed buyer's only legal remedy law in the doctrine of fraudulent 
concealment of a known defect to the limited extent that it existed under the applicable state law. 
It therefore eliminated for the foreseeable future, any judicial attempt to move in the direction of 
imposing any duty of disclosure whatsoever on members of the real estate industry. To the 
limited extent that a purchaser of real estate is benefited by the Prevailing Disclosure Act, all 
costs of that benefit 1iill on the individual seller rather than on the real estate professional. 
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Another category of relevant statutes is that of the various consumer protection acts, 
where again, the presumed purpose was to afford legal recourse to inadequately protected 
consumers. 62 In those somewhat analogous areas, the lawmakers seem to have concluded that the 
protection of the then inadequately protected investor or consumer was and desirable, 
that the disclosure form of regulation was effective, and that the costs of compliance were not 
unreasonably burdensome to the sellers and their agents, as compared to the resulting benefits for 
the protected class and the marketplace generally. 
The Prevailing Disclosure Act bas the appearance of being enacted in order to provide 
needed protection to the purchasers of residential real estate. Therefore, it too should be 
evaluated and measured against possible alternatives by balancing its benefits with its costs to all 
concerned parties. 
As set forth above, the purchaser of residential real estate bas a common law remedy 
against the seller and participating brokers for damages proximately caused by the 
misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment of known material defects. Prior to the enactment 
of the Prevailing Disclosure Act, neither sellers nor brokers in states other than California, Maine 
and New Hampshire had any duty to make any disclosure unless they had knowledge of a 
material defect. Furthermore, they bad no duty to inspect or to take other action to discover the 
existence of any material defects. 
As a practical matter, the buyer must undertake the same inspection of the premises as 
was necessary in the absence of the Prevailing Disclosure Act to protect against overpaying and 
to establish the element of reasonable reliance for a possible fraud claim. An unfortunate affect 
of the statute is that upon receiving a disclosure document with a formal and legalistic 
appearance, the buyer may assume that he or she is fully informed and forego such an 
investigation. 
Another cost to the buyer is the increase in price resuhing from the burdens of complying 
with the mandated disclosure requirements. A seller may reasonably believe that the 
complexities of the new law preclude her selling the property without the services of a broker, 
and will therefore increase the price to cover the broker's commission. Ironically, however, the 
imposition of greater duties of inspection and disclosure on the broker was short-circuited by the 
passage of the Prevailing Disclosure Act, which at the same time makes the broker more 
essential. 
Practically, however, the seller is forced or believes he is forced to engage a real estate 
broker in order to handle the required compliance at a cost that the seller may not be able to fully 
pass on to the buyer. The increased cost is at least a small burden on an individual's inherent 
right to acquire and sell real property, especially since many sellers list with brokers in any 
event. Again, ironically, while the broker becomes almost indispensable as a result of the 
statutory compliance obligations, that same statute not only fails to impose any new duties of 
inspection or disclosure on the broker but also even fiills to acknowledge any duties arguably still 
existing at common law. Accordingly, the statutory limit on a broker's potential liability to a 
defrauded purchaser bas shifted the risk of any such liability dramatically from the broker to the 
seller. 
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As a matter of substance, the seller's burden is on]y marginally increased since he or she 
is already obligated under common law principles to disclose all known defects. In addition, the 
seller gains some benefit since he cannot be held liable for any damage caused by a disclosed 
defect or condition. 
As mentioned above, the National Association of Reahors has been the prime impetus 
behind the passage of the Prevailing Disclosure Act.63 It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the 
benefits to the broker and the brokerage industry are enormous. Simply put, the statute enhances 
the dependence of a seller of residential real estate on the services of a broker, effectively limits 
the broker's liability for nondisclosure to the purchaser, and prevents the imposition of a duty on 
the broker to inspect and disclose to the purchaser the discoverable fruits of that inspection. The 
imposition of such a duty would likely occur through judicial development in the absence of the 
statutes' enactment. The Prevailing Disclosure Act provides some small-added disclosure to the 
purchaser.64 All of these effects occur at the expense of the seller rather than the broker, without 
a single cost to the broker. It would be difficuh to envision a statutory scheme better designed to 
further the special interests of the real estate brokerage industry. 
Another filctor that bears on defining the parameters of any required inspection is the 
scope of the inspection. The key question is whether the inspection should cover only readily 
accessible areas or consist of a more complete investigation. Again, this is related to the identity 
of the inspector. A seller inspection cannot be expected to extend beyond readily accessible 
areas; a professional home inspector will look for hidden defects and examine bard to reach 
areas. The real question arises if a statute requires a broker inspection. Based on an assumed 
level of expertise, it would be fair to require brokers to perform a more complete inspection. 
However, brokers are not as competent or experienced as professional home inspectors to 
perform a truly complete inspection are.65 Clearly, if the public policy goal of disclosure 
legislation is to fully inform the buyer of potential defects, a full, rather than a visual inspection 
is preferable. Following the scope of inspection logic would argue for broker inspection at a 
minimum and a professional inspection as preferable. 
If policy moves in the direction of a professional inspection, the legislature must deal 
with the issue of cost. Inspection and disclosure by the seller is cost-free to the parties and 
provides the buyer with no additional protection. Ahbough it is true that the broker may be 
liable for negligence or misfeasance if he does the inspection himsel£ Brokers are compensated 
almost universally on a commission basis, based on a percentage of the sales price. The 
commission covers all of the broker's activities in marketing the property, assisting the buyer 
and closing the transaction. The broker must undertake some level of property inspection for no 
other reason than to become fiu:niliar with the property and to make suggestions to the seller to 
repair or improve the house so it "shows" better. Requiring the broker to undertake a more 
complete physical inspection of the property for disclosure purposes does not materially add to 
the time or effort that he or she devotes to the property. 
On the other band, the old adage "you get what you pay for'' might apply to opting for a 
broker inspection solely because it imposes no additional cost on the transaction. The best 
protection comes from a professional inspection. Depending on the market area, type of 
property, and the items included in the inspection, home inspection costs typically range from 
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$500 to $1000. If the legislature mandates a professional inspection, it should allocate the cost 
of the inspection in the legislation. 
Most of the existing disclosure legislation applies the duty to sales of existing residences 
rather than newly constructed houses. This seems to be the correct approach. In most states, 
sales of newly constructed dwellings are covered by well-established warranty doctrines of 
merchantability, fitness and habitability. Several states have enacted legislation requiring that 
builders expressly or implicitly warrant the new home. Even where warranties are not statutorily 
mandated, many builders offer warranties as a marketing tooL In addition, state or local building 
inspectors during construction inspects all new construction. While such inspections do not 
assure absence or defects, they do provide adequate protection to the purchaser. 
Conclusion 
The cases and the statutes that followed will not shed a great deal of light upon how the 
courts will interpret or should interpret the statutes in the future, but they seem to be a step in the 
right direction. The decisions following the statutes in various states seem to construe 
ambiguous portions, both in the construction cases and the resale cases to the benefit of the 
purchasers. However, the statutes have created the ability to have limited liability and thus 
create generous defense portions of the statutes, which inevitably yield inequitable results. 
The statutes in residential construction cases have created the ability to significantly 
reduce the impact of the statute and have created different standards for builders in the 
construction cases, brokers in the limitation of their liability, and sellers in their ability to remain 
silent and not discuss defects which are not easily visible to the average purchaser. 
The unimpeded development of the common law would provide sufficient buyer 
protection without the necessity of state legislation. The Prevailing Disclosure Act weakens 
buyer protection compared to that developed by the common law. There are some benefits to 
but only if the legislati?n comprehensive and clear in mandating an 
mspection and diSClosure duty. The best solut10n IS a statute mandating that the seller or listing 
broker retain and provide an inspection report by a professional home inspector. Such an 
inspection should include all material elements of the bouse, including physical systems and 
other items located in inaccessible areas. 
One benefit of a statutory solution over continued development of the common law is that 
legislation would specify what items and systems must be inspected, which would make the 
disclosure obligation more uniform and less subject to interpretation. The item by item 
development of the common law leaves areas of uncertainty. What areas must be disclosed, 
what types of defects and the materiality of the defect must all is developed through litigation. 
One major advantage of legislation would be to clearly establish the types of things that must be 
disclosed, thus making the disclosure duty less subject to interpretive difficulties. A clearly 
defined disclosure obligation coupled with a professional inspection should serve to rationalize 
the seller's disclosure obligation and provide a high level of protection for the buyer. 
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As a resuh of the statutory allowable modifications, builder-vendors have been able to 
limit their liability substantially by contractual agreements. 
A companion paper prepared by me entitled DOES THE STATUTORY •'HOUSING 
MERCHANT IMPLIED WARRANTY'' OF GENERAL BUSINESS LAW - ARTICLE 36-B 
COMPLETELY SUPERSEDE THE COMMON LAW VERSION?" is also being distributed 
covering the resuhant statutory changes in New York, after the courts have expanded 
consumer/purchaser rights and duties. 
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